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ASYMMETRICINFORMATION
•Adifferenceinaccesstorelevantknowledgeis
calledinformationasymmetry.
HiddenActions:Pripals,Agents,andMoral
Hazard
•MoralHazard
•Moralhazardreferstothetendencyofa
whoisimperfectlymonitoredtoengagein
dishonestorotherwiseundesirablebehavior.
•Employerscanrespondtothemoral-hazard
probleminvariousways:
•Bettermonitoring.
•Highwages.
•Delayedpayment.
HiddenActions:Pripals,Agents,andMoral
Hazard
•MoralHazard
•Anagentisawhoisperforminganactfor
another,calledthepripal.
•Thepripalisaforwhomanother,
callednt,isperformingsomeact.
HiddenActions:Pripals,Agents,andMoral
Hazard
•AdverseSelection
•Adverseselectionreferstothetendencyforthe
mixofunobservedattributestoeundesirable
fromthestandpointofanuniformedparty.
HiddenActions:Pripals,Agents,andMoral
Hazard
•ExampleofAdverseSelection:
•Manytimepotentialbuyersmaynotevenconsiderused
carsbecausetheysurmisethatthesellersknow
somethingbadaboutthecars.Thisisalsoknownasthe
lemonsproblem.
•Insurance—Peoplewithhiddenhealthproblemsaremore
likelytowanttobuyhealthinsurancethanthosewith
goodhealth
•ertainlabormarkets,ifafirmreducesthewageit
pays,highproductivityworkerstendtoquit.
SignalingtoConveyPrivateInformation
•HowdoMarketsrespondtoAsymmetric
Information?
•Signaling
•Signalingreferstoanactiontakenbyaninformedparty
torevealprivateinformationtoanuninformedparty.
•
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