NBER WORKING PAPER 反腐运动对中国奢侈品进口的影响.pdf

The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Luxury Imports in China (Preliminary Draft) Nancy Qian and Jaya Wen April 2, 2015 Abstract This paper investigates the effects of a national anti-corruption pol- icy in China focused on reducing bribes and luxury consumption of gov- ernment officials. We document that it reduced the imports of luxury goods that are easily observed by the public by approximately 55%, 194 million 2012 USD, while having no effect on goods that can be consumed away from public view. Keywords: Corruption, Political Economy, Development JEL: P15, D73 We thank Abhijit Banerjee, Ray Fisman and Mikhail Golosov and the economics faculty at Fudan University and SUFE for their insights. Corresponding Author: nancy.qian@ jaya.wen@ 1 Introduction It is widely believed that corruption hinders growth (e.g., Fisman and Svens- son 2007; Mauro 1995; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993), and that the levels of bureaucratic corruption are higher in countries with non-democratic govern- ments because of weaker political competition and public pressure (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) and when government revenues are high (e.g., Brollo et al. 2013). This can be par- ticularly problematic in transition economies where government officials have considerable discretion over determinants of economic activity, like privatiza- tion of state assets and access to licenses critical for entrepreneurial ventures (Shleifer 1997). The main policy tool for combatting large-scale corruption is government policy. However, there is little evidence on the effectiveness of such policies.1 We address this impo