双向拍卖实验手册精选.doc

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双向拍卖实验手册精选

双头拍卖实验手册 一、介绍 Overview: This program runs a double auction in which buyers and sellers submit bids and offers in any order. This is called a double auction because bids tend to increase as in an English auction (e.g. for antiques), and at the same time, offers tend to decrease. Thus the bid-ask spread will narrow until one of the bids or offers is accepted. 简介: 这个程序验证的是双向拍卖实验。在双向拍卖中,买方和卖方可以以任何顺序提交出价和要价。之所以被称为“双向拍卖”是因为在英式拍卖中(例如,古董) 出价倾向于增加,与此同时,要价则倾向于减少。因此,买卖价差将逐渐缩小,直到其中的一个出价或者要价被接受。 Payoff Parameters: Seller units are given "costs" and buyer units are given "values". All values and costs are random draws from uniform distributions that you specify (rounded to the nearest dollar), unless you choose to enter your own values and costs. Sellers earn money by selling above cost, and buyers earn money by buying below value. You choose the number of rounds, and you have the option of switching to a new set of payoff parameters after a specified number of rounds (e.g. demand or supply shift, tax, price ceiling or floor). The instructions are automatically configured to conform to the parameters you select, and your instructor results page calculates data averages and competitive predictions by round and by treatment. 决定性参数: 卖者的单位是既定的成本,买者的单位是既定的价值。除了你自己输入的成本和收益外,其他所有的价值和成本都是随机从你设定的联合分布中抽取的(实行四舍五入),卖者通过高于成本出售而获得货币收入,买者通过低于价值购买而获得货币收入。你可以选择拍卖的回合数,在完成设定的回合数后,你可以选择设定一整套新的决定性参数 (如供应或需求移动、税收、价格上限或下限)。指令将自动配置以符合你的参数选择,你的指导员将生成结果页,并计算每一回合和每一次处理的数据平均值和竞争性预期值。 Discussion: The discussion can focus on the relationship between the trading data and the competitive (supply and demand) predictions. For a discussion of behavior in laboratory double auctions, see Davis and Holt (1993), Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. The first laboratory double auctions are reported in Smith (1962) "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 70(3), 111-137. 讨论: 讨论专注于交易数据竞争性预测值 (供给和需求)之间的关系。关于实验室双头拍卖行为的讨论,请参见: 戴维斯和霍尔特.1993.实验经济学.普林斯顿大学出版社。 在一篇经典

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